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THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
OF 1991: ADAPTING AN “ODD” LAW
Marissa J. Blasing*
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) was
introduced in 1991 before the rise of the cell phone, text messages, and
broadband internet. It placed restrictions on then-contemporary
technology used to reach consumers in an automated way and its
primary purpose was to protect consumer’s privacy interests and public
safety. Yet, it has proven to be an odd and increasingly outdated law.
The federal government has made a good-faith effort to maintain the
TCPA’s relevancy. However, evolving technology and inconsistent
interpretations of the law’s fundamental elements have resulted in harm
to consumers and businesses. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the law
also interfered with efforts to disseminate information quickly and
efficiently to the public at the detriment of consumers.
Last year, the Supreme Court brought some relief to businesses
after it issued its highly anticipated decision in Facebook v. Duguid. The
Court held that the capacity to use a random or sequential number
generator to either store or produce phone numbers is a necessary
feature of an Autodialer, rather than technology only needing the
capacity to store phone numbers to be called and to dial such phone
numbers automatically, a definition that once reached every American
using a smartphone.
Unfortunately, the Court was unable to modernize the law. With
innovative technologies and government-enabled programs directed at
protecting consumers’ privacy and economic interests, restrictions on
the type of technology used to make the calls are no longer necessary
today. The government can effectively accomplish its goal by regulating
the contents of the call, not the technology used to make the call.

* J.D., Santa Clara University School of Law, 2022. Editor-in-Chief, SANTA CLARA
LAW REVIEW, Volume 62.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly thirty years ago—when less than one percent of homes had
internet and only six percent of Americans had a cell phone1—Congress
passed the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (hereinafter
referred to as the “TCPA”) to regulate intrusive telephone marketing
practices.2 Throughout the decades, all three branches of the
government, compliance-minded businesses, and consumers have
struggled to understand the statute, which is now virtually inapplicable
to today’s technology.3 The United States Supreme Court first
interpreted the TCPA in 2012. The Justices took turns reflecting on the
law’s puzzling phraseology and referred to the statute as “odd.”4 Nearly
a decade later, in Facebook v. Duguid, Justice Thomas used the same
adjective to describe the issue before him—odd.5
At the time of the TCPA’s enactment, the advent of sophisticated
technology enabling computers to automatically dial telephone numbers
and transmit prerecorded messages allowed marketers to reach more
consumers than ever before.6 This latest technology offered a new and
lucrative opportunity for businesses, but consumers bore the cost as
unwanted calls began flooding their homes. Consumers were charged
costly per-minute rates, and more importantly, the calls tied up
emergency lines, creating public safety problems.7 As a result, Congress
approved legislation in November of 1991 to curb growing concerns.8
Initially, the TCPA prohibited the use of virtually all unsolicited
calls using prerecorded voice messages (i.e., robocalls),9 restricted the
1. Reuben Fischer-Baum, What ‘Tech World’ Did You Grow Up In?, WASH. POST
(Nov. 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/entertainment/techgenerations/.
2. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–243, § 2, 105 Stat.
2394, 2394 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2018)). The TCPA amended Title II of
the Communications Act of 1934. 47 U.S.C. § 201 (2018).
3. See infra Section II.B.
4. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC, 565
U.S. 368 (2012) (No. 10-1195) (“If both sides agree it’s odd, and all nine Justices agree it’s
odd, I mean, I think we can say this statute is odd.”).
5. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1163
(2021) (No. 19-511) (“I think it’s a little odd when we use these – we make great effort to
interpret a statute that really wasn’t intended for the universe in which we are operating
now.”).
6. An autodialer can reach 1,000 households a day, while a telemarketer could only
make roughly sixty-three calls each day. See 137 CONG. REC. 35302-07 (1991) (statement of
Rep. Markey).
7. Id.
8. See Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 § 2.
9. Id. § 3. In 1992, the FCC exempted from the prohibition calls: (1) not made for
commercial purposes; (2) made for commercial purposes which did not transmit an
unsolicited advertisement; (3) made to a party when there was an established business
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use of automatic telephone dialing systems (hereinafter referred to as
both an “ATDS” or “Autodialer”),10 and directed the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”) to develop rules.11 Since the
enactment, a technological revolution turned traditional landline
telephones into cellular telephones and cellular telephones into
smartphones; however, the statute has largely remained the same. The
FCC has endeavored to maintain the TCPA’s applicability to modern
technologies through numerous administrative rules and orders.12 The
judicial branch has also opined on thousands of inquiries, questioning
the FCC’s interpretation and overall applicability.13 Despite these
efforts, the TCPA remains out of touch with the needs of both business
and consumers and does not achieve its laudable goals.
While the original purpose of the TCPA was to regulate abusive,
invasive, and risky technology,14 it has been interpreted to regulate much
more. The TCPA has been construed to reach areas of communication
that do not include marketing15 and to new and contemporary
technologies,16 impacting millions of Americans. Furthermore, due to
inconsistent interpretations of the TCPA’s most fundamental terms, it
has also been wielded as a powerful tool to unleash devastating

relationship; and (4) non-commercial calls made by nonprofit organizations. Rules &
Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 7 FCC Rcd.
8752, 8755 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 FCC Order].
10. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 § 3(b). An automatic telephone dialing
system “means equipment which has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to
be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and to dial such numbers.” Id. §
3(a)(1).
11. 47 U.S.C. § 227 §3(b)(2) (2018). The FCC implemented its first rules in Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 7 FCC Rcd.
8752, 8753 (1992).
12. See, e.g., 1992 FCC Order, supra note 9; see also e.g., Rules & Regulations
Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 et al., 30 FCC Rcd. 7961,
7965 (2015) [hereinafter 2015 FCC Order]. These rules and orders prescribe implementation
procedures for the Act. 1992 FCC Order, supra note 9, at 8753.
13. See Alex McFall & Benjamin William Perry, Untouchable No More: Reinforcements
Arrive for TCPA Defendants Battling the FCC’s Aggressive Expansion of the Statute,
JDSUPRA (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/untouchable-no-morereinforcements-13691 (“[The TCPA] is the basis for thousands of lawsuits each year, with
one study reporting that TCPA actions have increased by 740 percent in the last decade
alone.”).
14. H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at 5-6 (1991).
15. See Griffith v. Consumer Portfolio Serv., Inc., 838 F. Supp. 2d 723, 727 (N.D. Ill.
2011) (“[W]e reject [the] argument that the TCPA only applies to telemarketing . . . .”).
16. Facebook argues in Duguid v. Facebook that the Marks expansive reading would
capture smartphones. See Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., 926 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2019),
rev’d, 141 S. Ct. 1163 (2021).
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punishments on large and small businesses.17 The TCPA is an odd law,
and it is odd that we are applying an “anachronistic, if not vestigial”18
law that is virtually inapplicable to today’s technology.19
On April 1, 2021, the Supreme Court issued its highly anticipated
decision in Facebook v. Duguid.20 The Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit’s interpretation and resolved a long-standing circuit split on the
definition of an Autodialer.21 The Court held that for technology to be
considered an Autodialer, it must have the capacity to use a random or
sequential number generator.22 While this decision narrows the
interpretation of an Autodialer,23 the law and its subsequent enforcement
remain unclear. The TCPA’s ambiguous terms and uncertain future is a
substantial source of legal risk for compliance-minded businesses
seeking to communicate with their customers.24 Moreover, Congress’
very own policy goals for enacting the law are now in question with the
introduction of consumer protection programs and the advancement of
technology.25
This Note will first discuss the original purpose and history of the
TCPA.26 It will examine the journey of the irresolute definition of an
“automatic telephone dialing system,” recent FCC and judicial
interpretations of an Autodialer, and the negative impact the law has on
businesses and consumers.27 Additionally, the Note will discuss
Facebook v. Duguid, which was recently decided by the Supreme Court,
including the relief it provided, as well as its shortcomings.28 Finally,
this Note will make a call to Congress to amend and modernize the
17. See JOSH ADAMS, ACA INT’L, THE IMPERATIVE TO MODERNIZE THE TCPA: WHY
OUTDATED LAW HURTS CONSUMERS AND ENCOURAGES ABUSIVE LAWSUITS (2016),
https://www.acainternational.org/assets/tcparesearchstatistics/the-imperative-to-modernizethe-tcpa-june-2016.pdf.
18. Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163 (2021)
(No. 19-511).
19. See generally Thomas Koulopoulos, The End Of The Digital Revolution Is Coming:
Here’s What’s Next, INC. (Aug. 11, 2019), https://www.inc.com/thomas-koulopoulos/theend-of-digital-revolution-is-coming-heres-whats-next.html (discussing the potential
capabilities of quantum computing).
20. See Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163 (2021).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. When George Bush signed the TCPA into law, he encouraged the Federal
Communications Commission to limit the law’s reach so that legitimate business activities
would not be affected. DENNIS BROWN, TELEPHONE TERRORISM THE STORY OF ROBOCALLS
AND THE TCPA 21-22 (2019) (ebook).
25. See infra Section IV.C.
26. See infra Section II A-B.
27. See infra Section II.C.
28. See infra Section II.C.2.b.
AN
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TCPA.29 It is abundantly clear that the TCPA cannot keep up with
modern technology and the judiciary’s limited power indicates that
Congress must drive the necessary change. This Note suggests that
Congress must acknowledge that it is not the technology used to make
the call that is intrusive to consumers, but rather the content of the calls.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Enactment and Purpose of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act
In the 1980s, during the heyday of telemarketing, telemarketing
calls were cheap and easy to make.30 Spending on telemarketing
increased from $1 billion in 1981 to $60 billion in 1991 and by the mid1990s, it accounted for more than $450 billion in annual sales.31 In
response to a growing concern over the prevalent use of telephone
marketing practices and numerous consumer complaints, Congress
enacted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 199132 and
empowered the FCC with authority to interpret and implement the law.33
At the time, the primary means of telephone communication was
the home phone or a business phone, as opposed to a cellular telephone.34
Phone calls were expensive. Long distance calls generally started at
$3.00—$6.12 in today’s dollars—and each additional minute cost more
money depending on the time of day or whether it was the week or
weekend.35 And for the six percent of Americans who were able to

29. See infra Section V.
30. Nick Jiwa, A Brief History Of Outbound Telesales, HELLER GROUP: BLOG (Apr. 11,
2018), http://www.thehellergroupinc.com/brief-history-outbound-telesales (“[T]elemarketing
proved to be an efficient model for driving sales.”). Telemarketing is the process of using the
telephone to generate leads, make sales, or gather marketing information. Telemarketers Law
and Legal Definition, USLEGAL, https://definitions.uslegal.com/t/telemarketers/ (last visited
Dec. 29, 2020).
31. Telemarketers Law and Legal Definition, supra note 30.
32. See Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, § 2, 105 Stat. 2394-95 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2018)) (describing that evidence compiled by congress suggests
that both residential telephone subscribers and businesses consider automated or prerecorded
telephone calls to be a nuisance and an invasion of privacy).
33. See id. (“The Federal Communications Commission should consider adopting
reasonable restrictions on automated or prerecorded calls to businesses as well as to the home,
consistent with the constitutional protections of free speech.”).
34. See Reuben Fischer-Baum, supra note 1.
35. See FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, STATISTICS OF COMMUNICATIONS COMMON
CARRIERS 217-27 (1991/1992 ed. 1992), https://www.fcc.gov/file/11628/download. I used the
US inflation calculator to determine the usage fees in today’s dollars. See Inflation Calculation
of the U.S. Dollar’s Value from 1913-2021, US INFLATION CALCULATOR,
usinflationcalculator.com (last visited Jan. 17, 2022).
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afford an expensive cellular telephone, they incurred high usage fees.36
It was at this time that Congress compiled evidence suggesting
consumers and businesses were frustrated with the costly per-minute
telephone charges37 and considered automated or prerecorded telephone
calls a nuisance and an invasion of privacy, regardless of the caller’s
identity or the contents of the message.38 Congress considered the use
of telephone marketing a “risk to public safety”39 because telemarketers
could program technology to automatically dial random and sequential
blocks of telephone numbers (as opposed to manual dialing), thereby
producing a risk of tying up emergency telephone lines.40
Technology that restricted telephone marketing calls (e.g., caller ID
or call blocking) was not commonly available or was even more costly
to consumers at the time.41 Therefore, Congress determined that the
“only effective means of protecting telephone consumers” was to impose
restrictions on the use of automated and prerecorded telephone calls.42
First, Congress prohibited nearly all unsolicited calls using “an artificial
or prerecorded voice” (i.e., robocalls).43 Second, Congress banned the
use of automatic telephone dialing systems to make calls to emergency
lines, hospital lines, and cellular telephones absent an emergency or
express consent from the consumer.44 Congress did not ban the use of
an Autodialer to all calls, only calls to those specific types of telephone
lines. This prevented the lines “from being utilized to receive calls from
those needing emergency services.”45 Congress also included cell
phones because the recipients were “inconvenienced and . . . charged for
receiving unsolicited calls.”46 Finally, Congress restricted fax machines
from sending unsolicited advertisements.47

36. See Reuben Fischer-Baum, supra note 1.
37. Samantha Duke, Hope Resets with Supreme Court to Clarify How TCPA Applies to
Current Tech, JDSUPRA (Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/hope-restswith-supreme-court-to-9856965/.
38. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 § 2.
39. Id. § 2(5) (“Unrestricted telemarketing, however, can be an intrusive invasion of
privacy and, when an emergency or medical assistance telephone line is seized, a risk to public
safety.”).
40. H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at 10 (1991).
41. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 § 2.
42. Id. at 2395 (emphasis added).
43. Id. § 2(b)(1).
44. Id.
45. H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at 24.
46. Id.
47. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 § 2(b)(1) (“[F]acsimile machine,
computer, or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile
machine . . . .”)
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At the time, Congress rejected concerns that the TCPA was
inconsistent with Frist Amendment protections.48 The committee
believed that the restrictions on calls were constitutional because they
were “a reasonable time, place and manner restriction on speech.”49
Besides, it was “clear that automated telephone calls that deliver[ed] an
artificial or prerecorded voice message [were] more of a nuisance and a
greater invasion of privacy than calls placed by ‘live’ persons.”50
Notably, the reasoning didn’t touch on the fact that Autodialers can be
used by live callers.
The TCPA endeavors to protect consumers by offering a robust
source of recovery for those that receive a call in violation of the statute.
It is a strict liability statute offering no cap or limitation on damages.51
With a private right of action for actual damages or statutory damages,
call recipients can recover a minimum of $500 per violation and
injunctive relief.52 The TCPA also includes a provision allowing the
court to increase the amount of the award by up to $1,500 per willful
violation.53 Additionally, Congress authorized state attorneys general to
bring civil actions and empowered the FCC to intervene thereby
increasing the number of potential litigants seeking corrective action.54
Thus, the TCPA’s damages provisions act as a substantial deterrent for
compliance-minded businesses and makes the legislation ripe for class
actions.
The FCC was tasked with implementing the law in a way that
accommodated individuals’ rights to privacy as well as legitimate
business interests.55 In fact, when President Bush signed the TCPA into
law, he encouraged the FCC to limit the law’s reach so that legitimate
business activities would not be affected.56 In response, the FCC
released its first order in 1992 exempting Autodialer prohibitions from
“established business relationship calls,” because if it “barr[ed]
Autodialer solicitations” where such a business relationship exists, the
law would “significantly impede communications between businesses
and their customers.”57 The law was not intended to “unduly interfere
48. S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 4 (1991).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) (2018).
52. Id. § 227(b)(3).
53. Id. (“If the court finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly . . . , the court may,
in its discretion, increase the amount of the award to an amount equal to not more than 3 times
the amount . . . .”).
54. See id. § 227(f)(3).
55. 1992 FCC Order, supra note 9, at 8754.
56. BROWN, supra note 24.
57. 1992 FCC Order, supra note 9, at 8770.
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with ongoing business relationships.”58 Neither the legislative nor the
executive branch intended to regulate all autodialing, only the especially
bothersome type of autodialing.
B. The Evolution of the TCPA
In the decades since the TCPA’s enactment, society has
experienced a digital revolution.59 All three branches of the government
have tried to decipher the odd law and clarify how the TCPA applies to
new and emerging technologies. Congress has amended the TCPA three
times,60 the FCC has released more than ten rulings,61 and the judiciary
has interpreted the TCPA in thousands of cases.62 However, these
attempts to maintain the law’s applicability to combat intrusive calls
have been unavailing and are routinely overturned by another authority.
1. TCPA Amendments
The TCPA was first amended to permit businesses that have a direct
relationship with a consumer to send unsolicited fax advertisements.63
Initially, the TCPA prohibited the use of “any telephone facsimile
machine, computer, or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement
to a telephone facsimile machine.”64 And, for over a decade the FCC
interpreted the law to provide businesses with an exception to the ban,
allowing them to send fax advertisements to their customers.65 However,
58. Id.
59. Katherine Schaeffer, U.S. has changed in key ways in the past decade, from tech use
to demographics, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2019/12/20/key-ways-us-changed-in-past-decade/ (“The past decade in the United States
has seen technological advancements, demographic shifts and major changes in public
opinion.”).
60. The TCPA was amended once to permit businesses with a direct relationship with a
consumer to send unsolicited fax advertisements. See Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-21, 119 Stat. 359. Additionally, the TCPA was amended to prohibit the
manipulation of caller ID information. See Truth in Caller ID Act Of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111331, 124 Stat. 3572. Finally, the TCPA was amended to exempt government debt collection
calls from TCPA restrictions. See Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-74, 129 Stat.
584. The Bipartisan Budget Act was subsequently found unconstitutional in Barr v. American
Association of Political Consultants. See Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Political Consultants, 140 S.
Ct. 2335 (2020).
61. FCC Actions on Robocalls, Telemarketing, FED. COMM. COMMISSION,
https://www.fcc.gov/general/telemarketing-and-robocalls (last visited Jan. 28, 2020).
62. See McFall, supra note 13.
63. See Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, § 2, 105 Stat. 2394, 2396 (codified
as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2018)).
64. Id. § 2(b)(1)(C).
65. The Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2004: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms.
& the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 108th Cong. 1 (2004) (statement of
Hon. Fred Upton, Chairman, Subcomm. on Telecomms & the Internet),
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in 2003 the FCC pivoted its interpretation of the law and required “every
business, small [and] large . . . to obtain prior written approval from each
individual before it sent a commercial fax.”66 Shortly before the new
rules were effectuated, the FCC agreed to stay the implementation and
Congress stepped in to “fix the law to resolve any lingering statutory
interpretation problems.”67 Congress recognized the logistical and
economic costs of the proposed rules and passed the Junk Fax Prevention
Act, amending the TCPA to affirm the previously established business
exemption allowing businesses to send commercial faxes to their
customers without first receiving written consent.68
Congress also passed the Caller ID Act to amend the TCPA to
prohibit the manipulation of caller ID information.69 Next, Congress
passed the Bipartisan Budget Act to exempt government debt collection
calls from TCPA restrictions.70 The Bipartisan Budget Act limited
liability for debt collectors for “debts owed to or guaranteed by the
Federal Government, including robocalls made to collect many student
loan and mortgage debts.”71 The amendment provided that these
collectors were no longer prohibited from using (1) an Autodialer or a
prerecorded call to cell phones; and (2) a prerecorded call to home
phones.72
However, the Supreme Court later overturned this
amendment.
2. SCOTUS Interpretations of the TCPA
In 2012, the Supreme Court interpreted the statutory text of the
TCPA for the first time in Mims v. Arrow Financial Services.73 The issue
before the Court was whether both federal and state courts had
jurisdiction to enforce the TCPA.74 At the time, the TCPA authorized
private suits for actual and statutory damages, stating that “a person or
entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State,
bring [an action] in an appropriate court of that State.”75 The text oddly
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-108hhrg95441/pdf/CHRG-108hhrg95441.pdf
[hereinafter Junk Fax Prevention Act Hearing]; see also 1992 FCC Order, supra note 9, para.
54, n.87, at 8779 (stating that the established business relationship was evidence that the
recipient has invited receipt of advertisements).
66. Junk Fax Prevention Act Hearing, supra note 65.
67. Id. at 2.
68. Id.
69. See Truth in Caller ID Act Of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-331, 124 Stat. 3572.
70. See Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-74, § 301, 129 Stat. 584, 588.
71. Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Political Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2343 (2020).
72. Id.
73. See Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368 (2012).
74. See id. at 376.
75. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (2018).
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excluded federal courts,76 which left TCPA enforcement primarily to
state and small claims courts.77 The Court unanimously reversed the
lower court’s ruling, explaining that the TCPA’s permissive grant of
jurisdiction to state courts was not a barrier to exercising federal question
jurisdiction.78
Two years ago, the Supreme Court found the Bipartisan Budget Act
unconstitutional. In Barr v. American Association of Political
Consultants, the Court found that that the exemption for the use of an
Autodialer to make government debt collection calls “impermissibly
favored debt-collection speech over political and other speech, in
violation of the First Amendment.”79 The Court applied strict scrutiny
because the law was making a content-based restriction on speech.80
While the Court struck down the provision, it rejected the plaintiff’s
argument for holding the entire 1991 restriction unconstitutional by
relying on severability principles.81
Most recently, the Court was asked to resolve a circuit split and
clarify the definition of an Autodialer in Facebook v. Duguid.82 The
Court issued a unanimous opinion rejecting a more expansive definition
which provided welcomed relief for businesses.83 However, as
discussed later in this Note, the ruling has raised complex questions
relevant to the context and application of the TCPA.84
3. FCC Orders and Rulings
In 1992, the FCC completed its first rulemaking mandated by the
TCPA.85 The order discussed the purpose of the TCPA and proposed
processes and procedures for eliminating unwanted telephone
solicitations.86 In accordance with the TCPA’s directive, it also
considered and rejected several regulatory alternatives to address the

76. See id.
77. There was also a split among the circuit courts on whether the federal courts could
hear private TCPA actions. See Mims, 565 U.S. at 376.
78. Id. at 386-87.
79. Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Political Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2343; see also infra
Section V.A.
80. Id. at 2346-47. The Government conceded that its justification of collecting
government debt was not sufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny. Id.
81. Id. at 2349.
82. Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163 (2021).
83. Id.
84. See infra Section III.A.
85. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 FCC Rcd. 2736, para. 1 (Apr. 17, 1992).
86. See 1992 FCC Order, supra note 9, at 8755-81.
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growing concern surrounding the use of automated technology and
telephone solicitations.87
The FCC first examined and rejected the idea of creating a federally
supported national do-not-call list as an alternative solution.88 The
FCC’s concerns associated with costs for the administration of such a
database and “the privacy concerns of consumers on a database list when
such a list [would be] maintained and accessible widely by private
entities” outweighed the benefit at the time.89 Second, the FCC
considered and rejected a network technology solution that required
telemarketers to use a particular telephone prefix and “allow[ed] callers
to screen out [those] telephone solicitations” because “it [wa]s not clear
whether the telephone numbering plan could support such a prefix.”90
The FCC also rejected and deferred ideas for comment, including special
directory markings requiring carriers to collect and tag customer’s
contact preferences in their directory, time of day call restrictions, and
industry or company-based do-not-call lists.91 As discussed later in the
Note, some of these alternatives are in fact viable, and the FCC and
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) have and are leveraging new
technology to provide consumers with the control to manage their call
preferences with much more precision than the TCPA’s restrictions on
Autodialers and pre-recorded messages.92
Since the enactment of the TCPA, the FCC has released additional
rulings in hopes of adapting the law to technology and marketplace
changes. A decade after its enactment, the FCC realized that “the
telemarketing industry ha[d] undergone significant changes in the
technologies and methods used to contact consumers,” and such
marketplace changes justified modifications to the implementation
rules.93 Thus, from 2003 to 2015, the FCC released a series of rulings
relying “on policy and legislative history to support its application of the
definition of ATDS to new technology.”94 However, as discussed below,
the FCC’s rules and orders have been met with controversy and
disagreement.95

87. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 85, at 2741.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 2742.
92. See infra Section IV.C.
93. See Rules & Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
1991, 18 FCC Rcd. 14014, 14017 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 FCC Order].
94. Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC, 904 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2018).
95. See infra Section II.C.
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C. The Evolution of an “Automatic Telephone Dialing System”
The statutory definition of an Autodialer has never changed.96
However, interpretations have differed.97 In an attempt to address the
TCPA’s reach, the FCC has promulgated rules on the contours of an
Autodialer and the use of such technology.98 At the same time,
businesses and consumers have looked to the courts to examine the
FCC’s rules—examinations generally leading to different outcomes.
Unfortunately, because of the lack of consistency, there has been little
success in maintaining a clear understanding of what technology
constitutes an “automatic telephone dialing system” and the associated
use limitations thereof.
For purposes of the TCPA, Congress defined an “automatic
telephone dialing system” as “equipment which has the capacity–(A) to
store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or
sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.”99 The
TCPA restricted the use of an Autodialer to make a call to certain
telephone lines, such as cellular phones, emergency lines, and hospital
rooms.100 This definition has been subject to extensive litigation that
culminated before the Supreme Court last year in Facebook v. Duguid.101
Early FCC ruling and orders were consistent with the statutory text
and the then-existing practices that powered its inception. The FCC’s
96. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) (2018); cf. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991,
§ 227, 105 Stat. 2394, 2395 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2018)); see also Marks
v. Crunch San Diego, 904 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Congress has never revised the
definition of an ATDS.”).
97. See 2015 FCC Order, supra note 12, at 7974 (“[T]he capacity of an Autodialer is not
limited to its current configuration but also includes its potential functionalities.”); c.f. ACA
Int’l v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 885 F.3d 687, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“[T]he Commission’s
expansive understanding of ‘capacity’ in the TCPA is incompatible with a statute.”).
98. The FCC released guidance on what constitutes an ATDS (or Autodialer) in 2003,
2008, and 2015. See 2003 FCC Order, supra note 93; see also Rules & Regulations
Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 23 FCC Rcd. 559 (2008)
[hereinafter 2008 FCC Order]; 2015 FCC Order, supra note 12.
99. 47 U.S.C. §227(a)(1) (2018).
100. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 § 2; BROWN, supra note 24, at 49.
101. See, e.g., Glasser v. Hilton Grand Vacations Co., 948 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2020)
(holding that device must contain a random or sequential number generator to qualify as an
ATDS under the TCPA); see also Gadelhak v. AT&T Servs., Inc., 950 F.3d 458, 465 (7th Cir.
2020) (holding that device must contain a random or sequential number generator to qualify
as an ATDS under the TCPA); ACA Int’l v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 885 F.3d 687, 698
(D.C. Cir. 2018) (“[T]he Commission’s expansive understanding of ‘capacity’ in the TCPA
is incompatible with a statute . . . .”); Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC, 904 F.3d 1041 (9th
Cir. 2018) (holding that “using a random or sequential number generator” only modifies the
verb “produce.”); Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163 (2021); cf. Duran v. La Boom
Disco, Inc., 955 F.3d 279, 284 (2nd Cir. 2020) (concluding that for technology to qualify as
an ATDS, it must have the “capacity . . . to store or produce telephone numbers to be called,
using a random or sequential number generator[.]”).
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first order affirmed the need of telemarketing restrictions on autodialing
technology to protect consumer’s privacy interests and alleviate risk to
public safety.102 It also acknowledged that the Autodialer prohibitions
“clearly do not apply” to the functionality of then-standard phones “like
‘speed dialing,’ ‘call forwarding,’ or public telephone delayed message
services . . . because the numbers called [we]re not generated in a
random or sequential fashion.”103 At the time, however, the rules did not
provide any additional information about the necessary functionality of
equipment qualifying as an Autodialer.104 Shortly thereafter, in 1995,
the FCC reiterated that the TCPA did not extend to calls “directed to
specifically programmed contact numbers,” because those calls were not
“directed to randomly or sequentially generated telephone numbers.”105
Over a decade later, limitations on autodialing technology were
extended to all calls, not only telemarketing calls.106 In its 2008 order,
the FCC stated that the statute prohibited the use of an Autodialer “to
make any call to a wireless number in the absence of . . . prior . . . consent
of the called party.”107 Therefore, the prohibition applied “regardless of
the content of the call[],” and was “not limited only to calls that
constitute ‘telephone solicitations.’ ” 108 Following the FCC order, the
courts have similarly rejected assertions that the TCPA should only be
applied to telemarketers.109 Thus, the prohibition on the use of an
Autodialer, absent consent or emergency purposes, applied to all calls,
regardless of the content of the call.
One of the fundamental principles of the TCPA, is that calls made
using an Autodialer cannot be made without prior express consent.110
Prior express consent is required to make non-solicitation calls to certain
phone lines using an Autodialer and prior written express consent is
102. 1992 FCC Order, supra note 9, at 8773.
103. Id. at 8776.
104. See generally 1992 FCC Order, supra note 9, at 8792 (“The terms automatic
telephone dialing system and Autodialer mean equipment which has the capacity to store or
produce telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator and
to dial such numbers.”).
105. Rules & Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991,
10 FCC Rcd. 12391, 12400 (1995).
106. See 2008 FCC Order, supra note 98, at 565 (“We note that this prohibition applies
regardless of the content of the call, and is not limited only to calls that constitute ‘telephone
solicitations.’ ” ); see also Griffith v. Consumer Portfolio Serv., Inc., 838 F. Supp. 2d 723, 727
(N.D. Ill. 2011) (relying on the FCC 2008 order to hold that “we reject [the] argument that the
TCPA only applies to telemarketing.”)
107. Griffith, 838 F. Supp. 2d at 727-8.
108. Id. at 728 (emphasis added).
109. See, e.g., Griffith, 838 F. Supp. 2d at 727 (“[W]e reject CPS’s argument that the
TCPA only applies to telemarketing, not debt collection.”).
110. S. REP NO. 102-178, at 4 (1991); 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2018).
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required to make telephone solicitation calls (i.e., telemarketing or
advertising) using an Autodialer.111 Without said consent, a business
may not place a call using an Autodialer, even if they have an established
business relationship. Both the FCC and the courts have construed
solicitation calls broadly.112 In fact, neither the proposition of a sale nor
an actual sale needs to occur during the call for the call to be a telephone
solicitation call.113 In addition, calls made for both non-solicitation and
solicitation purposes are considered telemarketing calls under the
TCPA.114
So, regardless of the content of the call, consent is required. The
type of consent varies depending on the type of the call. But the types
of calls are interpreted broadly. As a result, it is difficult to decipher
when and what type of consent is required when an Autodialer is
involved. The TCPA provides a limited exception to the consent
requirement for calls placed using an Autodialer if they are made for
emergency purposes.115 However, similar to other fundamental TCPA
terms, the definition of “emergency purpose” is unclear.116 It is highly
contextual, and it does not apply to every call related to health or
safety.117
1. The Emergence of New Technology and a New Definition of an
Autodialer
In 2002, after the advent of more sophisticated technologies and a
surge of TCPA-related inquiries,118 the FCC invited comments on the

111. An “advertisement” is defined by the Code of Federal Regulations as “any material
advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services,” and
“telemarketing” is defined as “the initiation of a telephone call or message for the purpose of
encouraging the purchase or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or services, which is
transmitted to any person.” 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(1), (12) (2012); see Mark A. Olthoff &
Robert V. Spake, Jr., Consent and Revocation Under the TCPA, IX NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 27,
2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/consent-and-revocation-under-tcpa.
112. Josh Stevens, TCPA Requirements FAQ, MACMURRAY & SHUSTER (July 11, 2021),
https://mslawgroup.com/tcpa-requirements-faq/.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2018).
116. See Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Emergency Text Messages Can Save Lives in a
Pandemic Without Running Afoul of the TCPA (Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.dorsey.com/
newsresources/publications/client-alerts/2020/03/emergency-text-can-save-lives-in-apandemic.
117. See id.
118. From June 2000 to December 2001, the Commission’s Consumer & Governmental
Affairs Bureau received over 26,900 TCPA-related inquiries. Rules & Regulations
Implementing Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 17 FCC Rcd. 17459, 17466
(2002) [hereinafter 2002 FCC Order].
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definition of an Autodialer and its impact on technology.119 The FCC
expressed interest in more popular tools and then-contemporary
technologies such as caller ID and predictive dialers.120
At the time, the FCC attributed the increase in telemarketing calls
to predictive dialers.121 Predictive dialers are list-based dialers that
allowed “telemarketers to devote more time to selling products and
services rather than dialing phone number[s].”122 However, the use of
predictive dialers “inconvenienced” consumers because they “initiate[d]
phone calls” from a specific list of phone numbers “while telemarketers
[were] talking to other consumers, [which] frequently abandoned calls
before a telemarketer [was] free to take the next call.”123
In 2003, the FCC expanded their interpretation of “capacity” from
the statutory definition of an Autodialer to cover predictive dialers.124
Before this expansion, legal experts believed that the TCPA did not
impact list-based dialers, like predictive dialers, because these dialers
did not use random or sequential number generators.125 The FCC
disagreed, reasoning that autodialing equipment, which has “the
capacity (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a
random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers,”
essentially meant “the capacity to dial numbers without human
intervention.”126 Predictive dialers arguably enabled callers to do
exactly what the Autodialer restrictions attempted to prevent: “dial
thousands of numbers in a short period of time.”127 Thus, an “unintended
result” would occur if the restrictions did not apply to predictive dialers
simply because the technology relied on a specific list of phone
numbers.128 As a result, companies had to obtain permission before
using a predictive dialer to call their customers’ wireless numbers or
“any other numbers for which the consumer [wa]s charged for the
call.”129

119. See id. at 17473.
120. Id. at 17472-73.
121. 2003 FCC Order, supra note 93, at 14054.
122. 2002 FCC Order, supra note 118, at 17465.
123. Id. at 17465.
124. See 2003 FCC Order, supra note 93, at 14092. Predictive dialers are “dialing systems
that ‘store pre-programmed numbers or receive numbers from a computer database and then
dial those numbers in a manner that maximizes efficiencies for call centers.’ ” Dominguez v.
Yahoo!, Inc., No. 13-1887, 2017 WL 390267, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2017).
125. BROWN, supra note 24, at 51.
126. 2003 FCC Order, supra note 93, at 14091-92 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 14092.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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In 2008, the FCC reinforced its 2003 guidance that predictive
dialers qualified as an Autodialer.130 It affirmed the extension of the
definition of an Autodialer to equipment that stores and later dials, even
if the phone numbers were not randomly generated.131 As technology
continued to advance, the FCC determined that the statute’s restriction
on “calls” encompassed additional methods of telemarketing, including
text messages.132 Similar to the concern for fees incurred for unsolicited
calls to a cell phone, the FCC reasoned that consumers incurred fees for
the receipt of unsolicited text messages.133 It argued that regardless of
whether a cell phone subscriber purchased a set of allotted minutes in
advance or after they were used, their minutes could be exhausted more
quickly if they received numerous unsolicited calls or texts.134
After incorporating new technologies into the meaning of the
statutory definition of an Autodialer for several years,135 the FCC issued
an order in 2015 confirming the sprawling interpretation.136 The ruling
also expanded the definition of “capacity,” holding that “the capacity of
an [Autodialer] is not limited to its current configuration but also
includes its potential functionalities” with modifications such as
software updates.137 In other words, technology that did not currently
have the ability to act as an Autodialer was now subject to the same
restrictions if it was at all possible that it could be converted into an
Autodialer.
Those in opposition argued that the FCC’s interpretation was
flawed “in the same way that saying an 80,000 seat stadium has the
capacity to hold 104,000.”138 The FCC disagreed, claiming that
Congress intended a broad definition.139 It affirmed both the statutory
definition and that an Autodialer need only have the “potential capacity”
to dial numbers randomly or sequentially, rather than possess the present
130. 2008 FCC Order, supra note 98, at 566.
131. 2003 FCC Order, supra note 93, at 14091-93; 2008 FCC Order, supra note 98, at
566-67.
132. See 2003 FCC Order, supra note 93, at 14115; see, e.g., Satterfield v. Simon &
Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A] text message is a ‘call’ within the
TCPA.”).
133. See 2003 FCC Order, supra note 93, at 14115. The FCC determined that
telemarketers had no way to determine how consumers were charged for their mobile service.
Id.
134. Id.
135. See id. at 14093 (finding that predictive dialers fall within the meaning of an ATDS);
cf. 2008 FCC Order, supra note 98, at 566 (stating that the capacity to dial numbers without
human intervention is basic functionality of an ATDS).
136. 2015 FCC Order, supra note 12, at 7964.
137. Id. at 7974.
138. Id.
139. Id.

428

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:62

ability to do so.140 The FCC argued it had already implicitly rejected a
“present use” or “current capacity” test after its determination that
predictive dialers fell under the definition of an Autodialer.141 This
change meant that “capacity” could be achieved through modifications
or updates to the technology.142 The technology did not have to currently
possess the capacity to dial numbers randomly or sequentially or utilize
such technology during a call to a consumer.143
Shortly thereafter, in ACA International v. FCC, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit144 considered challenges to the FCC’s
2015 guidance on the definition of an Autodialer and rejected elements
of the FCC’s rulings.145 The court held that if “capacity” included
“potential functionalities” or “future possibility,” not just a “present
ability,”146 the FCC’s expansive interpretation was unreasonable given
that the interpretation would extend the TCPA to millions of everyday
callers using a smartphone.147 The FCC’s guidance was impermissible
because it was “arbitrary and capricious.”148 Therefore, the court
overturned the 2015 interpretation.149 Months later, the Third Circuit
followed suit and also set aside the FCC’s “potential capacity”
interpretation.150 The court held that for equipment to qualify as an

140. Id. The FCC rationalized its determination by stating a present use or present capacity
test might render the protections meaningless because modern dialing equipment could
circumvent the definition of an ATDS. Id. at 7976.
141. 2003 FCC Order, supra note 93, at 14091. A predictive dialer is “equipment that
dials numbers” and, when connected to certain software, “has the capacity to store or produce
numbers and dial those numbers at random, in sequential order, or from a database of
numbers.” Id. Both the FCC and courts have concluded that predictive dialers may fall within
the scope of the TCPA because it has the capacity to dial phone numbers without human
intervention. Id. at 14092–93; see, e.g., Nunes v. Twitter, Inc., No. 14-cv-02843-VC, 2014
WL 6708465, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2014) (finding that an ATDS “appears to encompass
any equipment that stores telephone numbers in a database and dials them without human
intervention”).
142. 2015 FCC Order, supra note 12, at 7974 (“[T]he capacity of an Autodialer is not
limited to its current configuration but also includes its potential functionalities.”).
143. See id. at 7974 (“[A]utodialers need only have the ‘capacity’ to dial random and
sequential numbers, rather than the ‘present ability’ to do so.”).
144. Hereafter, federal appellate courts will be referenced to informally, e.g., the D.C.
Circuit.
145. See ACA Int’l v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 885 F.3d 687, 695 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
146. 2015 FCC Order, supra note 12, at 7974.
147. See ACA Int’l, 885 F.3d at 700 (discussing a smartphone could qualify as an
Autodialer because it has the inherent capacity to gain the necessary ATDS functionality by
downloading an application).
148. See id. at 699-700.
149. Id. at 703.
150. See Dominguez on Behalf of Himself v. Yahoo, Inc., 894 F.3d 116, 119 (3d Cir.
2018).
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Autodialer, it must have “the present capacity to function as [an]
autodialer.”151
2. A Fresh Start for the Definition of an Autodialer
After ACA International, courts agreed that the decision invalidated
the FCC’s guidance from 2003, 2008, and 2015.152 At the end of 2018,
in Marks v. Crunch San Diego, the Ninth Circuit took the opportunity to
rearticulate the meaning of an Autodialer.153 The court reasoned that
“only the statutory definition of [an] ATDS as set forth by Congress in
1991 remains,” and that after the Seventh Circuit’s decision in ACA
International, “we must begin anew to consider the definition of ATDS
under the TCPA.”154 Yet, what this really meant was that the court must
begin anew to consider the interpretation of the statutory definition
because the statutory definition of an Autodialer had (and has) never
been altered. The court was in fact reimagining both the interpretation
and reach of the same words that have been present since the enactment
of the TCPA in 1991.
a. The Marks Definition of an Autodialer
In a dispute over whether Crunch Fitness utilized an Autodialer to
send gym members text messages, the Ninth Circuit held “that the
statutory definition of ATDS is not limited to devices with the capacity
to call numbers produced by a ‘random or sequential number generator,’
but also includes devices with the capacity to dial stored numbers
automatically,” even if those numbers are not automatically generated.155
The court’s opinion unquestionably evoked the FCC’s recently
overturned expansive interpretation, reasoning that Congress had never
updated the definition of an Autodialer, therefore,
Congress’s intent [was] to regulate equipment that is “automatic,”
and that has “the capacity” to function in two specified ways: “to
store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or

151. See id. at 119 (emphasis added). Here, the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court’s
decision to grant summary judgment in defendant’s favor because the text-message service
did not have the present capacity to store or produce telephone numbers using a random or
sequential number generator. Id. at 121.
152. See, e.g., Marks v. Crunch San Diego, 904 F.3d 1041, 1049 (9th Cir. 2018); see also
e.g., Richardson v. Verde Energy U.S.A., Inc., 354 F. Supp. 3d 639, 648 (E.D. Pa. 2018).
153. See Marks, 904 F.3d at 1052.
154. Id. at 1049-50.
155. Id. at 1052.
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sequential number generator” and “to dial” those telephone
numbers.156

Therefore, its “decision to regulate only those devices which have the
aforementioned functions” remained unchanged.157
The court concluded that “using a random or sequential number
generator” modifies only the verb “to produce,” and not the preceding
verb, “to store.”158 As a result, an Autodialer was “equipment which has
the capacity”: (1) “to store numbers to be called . . . and to dial such
numbers automatically” or (2) “to produce numbers to be called, using a
random or sequential number generator and to dial such numbers
automatically.”159 This meant the use of a random or sequential number
generator was not required for a device to be considered an Autodialer.
A device that stored numbers and dialed them automatically fell under
this new definition.
Furthermore, the court rejected the argument that an Autodialer
must be fully automatic (meaning that it must function without human
intervention) and that any equipment that “could engage” (i.e., capacity
to engage) in automatic dialing qualified as an Autodialer.160 This meant
that an Autodialer didn’t actually need to use automatic dialing, mere
capacity for such use was sufficient.161 In other words, a device which
stores numbers and has the capacity to use automatic dialing (e.g., via
software updates) was an Autodialer.
Thus, the interpretation of an Autodialer again did not require the
technology to use a random or sequential number generator, and only
required the capacity (not present ability) to automatically dial stored
numbers. The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation unmistakably returned to
the once expansive Autodialer interpretation, the same expansive
interpretation that reached smartphones and was found unreasonable
because placing restrictions on every smartphone holder is absurd.162
156. Id. at 1044-45 (citing Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102243, § 227, 105 Stat. 2394, 2395).
157. Id. at 1045.
158. Id. at 1052.
159. Marks, 904 F.3d at 1052-3.
160. Id. at 1052 (“Congress made it clear that it was targeting equipment that could engage
in automatic dialing, rather than equipment that operated without any human oversight or
control.”).
161. See generally id.
162. See, e.g., ACA Int’l v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 885 F.3d 687, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
(“It is untenable to construe the term ‘capacity’ in the statutory definition of an ATDS in a
manner that brings within the definition’s fold the most ubiquitous type of phone equipment
known, used countless times each day for routine communications by the vast majority of
people in the country.”); Brief of Defendant-Appellee at *3, Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., 926
F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2019) (No. 17-15320) (“Under Plaintiff’s definition, the term ATDS
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b. Emerging Split of Authority and Facebook v. Duguid
In the few years since Marks, a deepening split of authority
emerged. Some courts adopted Marks,163 while others aligned with ACA
International requiring a present capacity to generate random or
sequential telephone numbers in order to qualify as an Autodialer under
the TCPA.164 In 2017, a class action lawsuit was filed against Facebook,
alleging Facebook’s use of an Autodialer in sending text messages
without prior express consent as a security precaution after an
unrecognized device logged into an account.165 In July 2017, the district
court dismissed the complaint for a second time for failure to sufficiently
allege that the text messages received by plaintiffs were sent using an
Autodialer.166 The court concluded that the plaintiff’s alleged facts
actually suggested that Facebook did not dial the phone numbers
randomly.167 Rather, the text messages were targeted and, therefore,
there was no indication that Facebook used an Autodialer.168

encompasses millions of recent-generation smartphones, all of which are equipped with a ‘do
not disturb’ function that (once activated by a user with a simple tap) automatically sends
responses to incoming messages from people in the user’s contact list (or a select subset of
them).”).
163. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Hosopo Corp., 371 F. Supp. 3d 26 (D. Mass. 2019); see also
King v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 894 F.3d 473 (2d Cir. 2018) (concluding that for a dialing
system to qualify as an ATDS, “the phone numbers it calls must be either stored in any way
or produced using a random-or sequential-number-generator”); see also, e.g., Allan v. Pa.
Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 968 F.3d 567, 579-80 (6th Cir. 2020) (holding that under
the TCPA, an Autodialer is defined as “equipment which has the capacity (A) to store
[telephone numbers to be called]; or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random
or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers”).
164. See, e.g., Glasser v. Hilton Grand Vacations Co., 948 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2020)
(holding that device must contain a random or sequential number generator to qualify as an
ATDS under the TCPA); see also, e.g., Gadelhak v. AT&T Servs., Inc., 950 F.3d 458, 465
(7th Cir. 2020) (holding that device must contain a random or sequential number generator to
qualify as an ATDS under the TCPA); see also, e.g., Collins v. Nat’l Student Loan Program,
360 F. Supp. 3d 268 (D.N.J. 2018) (holding that the predictive dialer was not an ATDS
because there was no proof that the device had the present capacity to randomly or
sequentially generate numbers); see also, e.g., Fleming v. Associated Credit Servs., Inc., 342
F. Supp. 3d 563 (D.N.J. 2018) (arguing that based on the statutory text, technology is not an
ATDS if it dials numbers from a list that was not randomly or sequentially generated at its
creation); see also, e.g., Smith v. Navient Sols., LLC, No. CV 3:17-191, 2019 WL 3574248,
at *8 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2019) (“the device itself must have the capacity to generate numbers”).
165. Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., No. 15-CV-00985-JST, 2017 WL 635117, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 16, 2017), rev’d, 926 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2019), rev’d, 141 S. Ct. 1163 (2021). Duguid
claimed Facebook sent him text messages, despite him not being a Facebook user. The text
messages were sent to alert the account owner that the account had been accessed by an
unrecognized device. Id.
166. Id. at 5.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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In 2019, after the Marks decision, the Ninth Circuit leveraged its
new (and reminiscent) Autodialer definition and overturned the lower
court’s ruling.169 Facebook argued that the court should not apply the
Marks’ definition of an Autodialer because its reach captured
smartphones since smartphones can “store numbers and, using built-in
automated response technology, dial those numbers automatically.”170
Facebook explained that
[S]martphones have the capacity as currently programmed to “store
numbers” and—via their “do not disturb” function—to respond
automatically to incoming messages. Thus, if an ATDS encompasses
all devices with that capacity, then tens of millions of modern
smartphone users are subject to a $ 500 to $ 1,500 penalty every time
they text a friend or family member (unless they have obtained prior
express consent).171

If smartphones were an Autodialer, then Congress was
unconstitutionally “imposing crippling financial penalties on tens of
millions of Americans.”172
Facebook further argued that Marks was inapplicable because
Facebook had stored phone numbers to be called in response to activity
outside of Facebook’s control. Facebook’s stored phone numbers were,
therefore, distinct from the traditional telephone solicitations found in
Marks.173 However, the court dismissed the argument and reasoned that
such a distinction would not prevent smartphones from qualifying as an
Autodialer.174 As a result, Facebook’s argument did not support their
original contention that smartphones qualify as an Autodialer under the
Marks definition.175 Moreover, the court didn’t seem to appreciate
Facebook’s argument that the Marks definition encompassed
smartphones and ultimately rejected Facebook’s arguments.176
169. Marks v. Crunch San Diego, 904 F.3d 1041, 1052 (9th Cir. 2018).
170. See Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., 926 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2019), rev’d, 141 S. Ct.
1163 (2021).
171. Brief of Defendant-Appellee at *37, Duguid, 926 F.3d 1146 (No. 17-15320).
172. Id.
173. The text messages at issue in Facebook v. Duguid were security alerts intended to
notify the Facebook account user associated with the phone number that the account had been
accessed on an unrecognized browser. See Duguid, 926 F.3d 1146. Whereas in Marks v.
Crunch San Diego, the messages at issue were “marketing text messages.” Brief of PlaintiffAppellant, Marks v. Crunch San Diego, 904 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 14-56834).
174. See Duguid, 926 F.3d at 1151-52.
175. Id. at 1152 (“Facebook’s argument that any ATDS definition should avoid
implicating smartphones provides no reason to adopt the proposed active-reflexive distinction.
Even if Facebook’s premise has merit, the quintessential purpose for which smartphone users
store numbers is ‘to be called’ proactively. In other words, excluding equipment that stores
numbers ‘to be called’ only reflexively would not avoid capturing smartphones.”).
176. Id.
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Left with a definition that an Autodialer need only have the capacity
to store phone numbers to be called and to dial such numbers
automatically, Facebook submitted a writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court.177 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, heard oral arguments
on December 8, 2020,178 and released its opinion on April 1, 2021.179
The unanimous decision, delivered by Justice Sotomayor, focused
on the construction of the statutory language of the definition of an
Autodialer.180 Agreeing with Facebook, the Court reasoned that given
the “most natural reading of the text . . . it would be odd to apply” the
clause “using a random or sequential number generator” to only store or
produce.181 Thus, the Court held that the “necessary feature of an
autodialer . . . is the capacity to use a random or sequential number
generator to either store or produce phone numbers to be called.”182 This
meant that technology using a random or sequential number generator
must be applied to the storage or production of telephone numbers to be
considered an Autodialer. In other words, technology which simply had
the capacity to store phone numbers to be called and to dial such
numbers automatically was not sufficient to trigger the Autodialer
restrictions; it needed to use a random or sequential number generator.
The Court concluded that the definition “excludes equipment like
Facebook’s login [security] notification system,” which sends automated
login notification texts to its users.183
The Court’s interpretation (and thus the new definition) that an
Autodialer must have the capacity to generate numbers randomly or
sequentially—not simply the capability to dial from a list184—
significantly limits the technology subject to the TCPA’s restrictions. A
definition that once could be interpreted to extend to smartphones (and
thus millions of Americans) was now properly tailored to apply to
technology using a random or sequential number generator.185 Despite
the welcomed outcome, the opinion left some uncertainty. Latent

177. See Brief for Petitioner, Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163 (2021) (No. 19511).
178. Facebook Inc. v. Duguid, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/facebook-inc-v-duguid/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2021).
179. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1165, 1169 (emphasis added).
182. Id. at 1173.
183. Id. at 1166.
184. Id. at 1173.
185. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. at 1170 (“Congress’ definition of an autodialer requires that in all
cases, whether storing or producing numbers to be called, the equipment in question must use
a random or sequential number generator.”).
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ambiguities will undoubtedly lead to lawsuits testing the new definition,
and the threat of lawsuits will surely chill speech.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
Congress enacted the TCPA nearly a year before the first text
message was ever sent, 186 and when cell phones were a luxury.187 As
drafted, the law struggles to account for contemporary technologies, yet
it has endured a digital revolution. The original purpose of the TCPA
was designed to curb “telemarketing” abuses by “solicitors.”188
However, inconsistent interpretations of fundamental terms and the
inherent ambiguity and anachronistic nature of the law negatively
impacts companies’ ability to communicate with consumers, even after
the favorable Supreme Court ruling in Facebook v. Duguid.189
A. Lingering Issues After Facebook v. Duguid
Once again, the court has limited the definition of an Autodialer.190
This will certainly provide some reprieve for businesses using automated
technology to call or text their customers for legitimate business
purposes. However, in its opinion, the Court avoided and advanced
several issues. First, the Court refrained from discussing the meaning of
the word “automatic” or how much human intervention was required to
avoid qualifying as an Autodialer.191 It also introduced uncertainty into
the longstanding “use” versus “capacity” debate by stating in its opinion
that “Congress’ definition of an Autodialer requires that . . . the
equipment . . . must use a random or sequential number generator.”192
186. Charles Arthur, Text messages turns 20 – but are their best years behind them?, THE
GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2012, 2:45 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/dec/02/
text-messaging-turns-20. The first text message was sent on December 3, 1992, and a
responsive text was not sent until nearly a year later. Id.
187. See generally Fischer-Baum, supra note 1.
188. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2018).
189. Mark Olthoff, TCPA Litigation: Widening Circuit Split Over Autodialer May Drive
Supreme Court Consideration, JDSUPRA (Mar. 9, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/
legalnews/tcpa-litigation-widening-circuit-split-35969/ (“Changing technologies and
divergent district court rulings have created a patchwork of often inconsistent
interpretations. . . . Companies with text messages flowing to people in various jurisdictions
can be left with significant uncertainty about their operations, and potentially substantial
liability simply dependent upon the location of the recipient.”).
190. See discussion supra Section II.C.
191. Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163, 1171 n.6 (“[A]ll devices require some
human intervention, whether it takes the form of programming a cell phone to respond
automatically to texts received while in ‘do not disturb’ mode or commanding a computer
program to produce and dial phone numbers at random. We decline to interpret the TCPA as
requiring such a difficult line-drawing exercise around how much automation is too much.”).
192. Id. at 1170 (emphasis added).
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The absence of “capacity” may have been a simple oversight. Yet,
regardless of the reason, the absence will cause more confusion for the
definition of an Autodialer. Finally, the Court expressly declined to
opine on whether the lower courts correctly interpreted text messages as
“calls” under the TCPA.193
The opinion also triggered an emotional response from Congress,
suggesting an uncertain future. Senator Markey, one of the original
authors of the TCPA, along with Senator Eshoo were shocked by the
opinion and threatened legislation to amend the TCPA in a way that
could make the ruling obsolete.194 In a joint statement, the lawmakers
said: “It was clear when the TCPA was introduced that Congress wanted
to ban dialing from a database. By narrowing the scope of the TCPA,
the Court is allowing companies the ability to assault the public with a
non-stop wave of unwanted calls and texts, around the clock.”195
In considering the Senators’ response to the Supreme Court’s
opinion, it’s hard to imagine that Congress intended to ban all dialing
from a database. Every smartphone arguably stores a database of phone
numbers for the caller to choose from at their discretion. The intent was
to protect telephone holders, not subject them to the TCPA’s restrictions.
B. Lingering Issues with the Fundamentals
Since its enactment, the TCPA has been a source of significant legal
risk for companies. Fundamental definitions have fluctuated over the
years, causing confusion for decades. With unreliable definitions, it is
hard for compliance-minded businesses to know whether they are
complying with the law, ultimately chilling their speech with consumers.
Originally, the TCPA regulated telemarketers.196 Yet since its
enactment, the TCPA has been wielded against all calls, regardless of
the content of the call, not just telemarketers.197 Additionally, as
discussed at length in this Note, the interpretation of an Autodialer has
differed throughout the years, at one time reaching smartphones.198

193. Id. at 1168 n.2 (noting that the court assumed that the TCPA’s prohibition also
extends to sending unsolicited text messages, therefore, the court declined to consider or
resolve the issue.); cf. infra note 74.
194. See Press Release, Ed Markey, U.S. Sen. for Mass., Senator Markey and Rep. Eshoo
Blast Supreme Court Decision on Robocalls As “Disastrous” (Apr. 1, 2021),
https://www.markey.senate.gov/news/press-releases/senator-markey-and-rep-eshoo-blastsupreme-court-decision-on-robocalls-as-disastrous.
195. Id.
196. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at 10 (1991).
197. See 2008 FCC Order, supra note 98, at 565.
198. See supra Section II.C.
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The FCC’s idea of “consent” has also varied throughout the years.
The Junk Fax Prevention Act is evidence that Congress didn’t intend for
TCPA restrictions to apply to businesses who have established
relationships with their customers.199 In these cases, the business
relationship alone was evidence of consent.200 Even so, express consent
is still required for all autodialed calls, and prior written express consent
is required for all autodialed solicitation calls.201 To make matters even
more challenging for companies sending legitimate messages to
consumers, the statutory definition of “solicitation calls” continues to be
construed broadly. A sale nor a proposition of a sale need to occur for a
call to be deemed a solicitation call.202 This provides businesses with
little to no help in knowing whether they are complying with the TCPA
when they are using autodialing technology to support communications
with their customers or employees. Finally, the “emergency purposes”
exception to the general rule requiring consent to use an Autodialer is
also unclear and context specific.203
The TCPA has been used to attack numerous pro-consumer
business practices over the years.204 One of the primary reasons for this
is the statutory damages provisions providing an award of $500-$1,500
per call205 which acts as a considerable multiplier in class action
litigation. Businesses seeking to communicate with their customers are

199. Junk Fax Prevention Act Hearing, supra note 65.
200. Id. Moreover, the FCC itself has previously concluded that a solicitation to a
consumer whom the business has a relationship does not adversely affect their privacy
interests. 1992 FCC Order, supra note 9, at 8770-71, para. 34.
201. If an autodialed or prerecorded call is not for telemarketing purposes, consent may
be written or oral. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a) (2012). For autodialed or prerecorded-voice
telemarketing calls to a mobile phone number, prior express consent must be written. Rules
& Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 27 FCC Rcd.
1830, 1838 para. 20 (2012); see also 2015 FCC Order, supra note 12, at 7968 (“If the call
includes or introduces an advertisement or constitutes telemarketing, consent must be in
writing.”).
202. Stevens, supra note 112. A “telephone solicitation means the initiation of a telephone
call for the purpose of encouraging the purchase or rental, or investment in, property, goods,
or services, which is transmitted to any person, but such term does not include a call or
message (A) to any person with that person’s prior express invitation or permission, (B) to
any person with whom the caller has an established business relationship or (C) by a tax
exempt nonprofit organization.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4) (2018).
203. See Jason C. Gavejian & Maya Atrakchi, FCC’s Declaratory Ruling on the TCPA’s
“Emergency Purposes” Exception During COVID-19: Does it apply to Workplace
Correspondence?, X NAT’L L. REV. (Apr. 22, 2020) https://www.natlawreview.com/article/
fcc-s-declaratory-ruling-tcpa-s-emergency-purposes-exception-during-covid-19-does-it
(discussing limited guidance and a narrow interpretation).
204. See, e.g., Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163 (2021) (discussing security text
messages).
205. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (2018).
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left to choose between silence or defending an action where the alleged
statutory damages could be in the millions (or billions).
While consumers deserve protection against unwanted calls, the
TCPA has not proven to be the source of relief Congress once hoped it
would be. Rather, it has proven to be a source of confusion. Even when
businesses strive to comply with the law, the uncertainties and
deficiencies create a risk of litigation requiring businesses to limit
communications with their customers. This played out during the
COVID-19 pandemic.
Cautious businesses limited their
communications, generally to the detriment to the consumer.
1. The TCPA’s Impact on Communications During the COVID-19
Pandemic
At the outset of the pandemic, companies were probing the FCC
about the limitations of efficient communication with their customers,
prospective customers, and employees.206 In response to these questions
and only nine days after the World Health Organization declared the
COVID-19 outbreak a pandemic, the FCC issued a declaratory ruling on
March 20, 2020.207 It provided clarification and context around the
narrow emergency-related exception to automated and prerecorded
restrictions during the pandemic.208 However, the ruling was not without
the TCPA’s all-too-common ambiguities.209
The ruling clarified that calls and texts using an Autodialer
necessitated by the pandemic fell under the “emergency purposes” safe
harbor.210 This meant that pandemic-related calls and texts weren’t
subject to the same consent requirements as other calls and texts. The
caller had to be a hospital, health care provider, health official, or other
government official, or a person under their express direction and acting
on their behalf.211 Additionally, the call had to be solely informational,
206. See, e.g., Petition for Expedited Declaratory Ruling on Emergency Purposes
Exception (2020) (No. 02-0278), https://www.cuna.org/content/dam/cuna/advocacy/
removing-barriers-blog/2020/documents/ABA_JointTrades_Petition_Emergency_Purposes_
Exception_2020_03_30_final.pdf.
207. The World Health Organization declared the COVID-19 pandemic as a pandemic on
March 11, 2020. World Health Organization, Listings of WHO’s response to COVID-19,
https://www.who.int/news/item/29-06-2020-covidtimeline (last updated Jan. 29, 2021); see
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG
Docket No. 02-278, Declaratory Ruling, DA 20-318 (2020) [hereinafter 2020 FCC Order].
208. 2020 FCC Order, supra note 207.
209. See id. The FCC’s requirement that calls be made by its specifically enumerated
callers will likely raise questions as to whether this now excludes the same communications
made by other callers.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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“made necessary because of the COVID-19 outbreak, and directly
related to the imminent health or safety risk arising out of the COVID19 outbreak.”212 No other exceptions were provided.
Unfortunately, the pandemic created an environment “ripe for
predatory lending and fraud” and scammers were capitalizing on trusting
consumers.213 Financial institutions seeking to protect their clients
wanted to send fraud and security alerts to ensure they didn’t fall for the
surge of financial scams.214 However, many financial institutions were
cautious about communicating quickly with their customers because of
the lack of precedent and threat of class action litigation.215
Financial institutions also sought to offer payment deferrals, fee
waivers, extension of repayment terms, and other beneficial services
“intended to protect or support the financial health or safety of
consumers” when they needed it most.216 The fear of debilitating
damages led several financial institutions to petition the FCC on March
30, 2020 to provide an expedited ruling to clarify that phone calls and
text messages on matters related to the COVID-19 pandemic were made
for “emergency purposes.”217 They were seeking confirmation of an
exemption from the restrictions,218 but, that ruling never came.219 It was
clear from this experience that the law’s uncertainty chilled
communication during a time that consumers needed help the most.
The TCPA is odd; it is outdated and unclear. It has a confusing and
complicated past with the FCC, Congress, and the judiciary disagreeing
on its most essential components. Moreover, it limits well-intentioned
businesses from communicating with their customers and harms those it
was originally intended to protect.

212. Id.
213. Petition for Expedited Declaratory Ruling on Emergency Purposes Exception, supra
note 206, at 9-10.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. On July 28, 2020, the Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau released a
public notice clarifying the FCC’s 2020 ruling and emergency COVID-19 related calls. The
public notice confirmed that the TCPA’s emergency exception applied to calls and texts made
by health care entities but did not include financial institutions. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n,
Public Notice on Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau Clarification On Emergency
Covid-19 Related Calls (July 28, 2020), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-20793A1.pdf [hereinafter Public Notice]. See infra Section II.C.
219. See, e.g., Public Notice, supra note 218.
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IV. ANALYSIS
Since the enactment of the TCPA, technology has advanced
rapidly, keeping up with consumer expectations and demand.220 Cell
phones, smartphones, and text messages are widespread 221 and a way of
doing business by the touch of a button. The ever-expanding reach of
the TCPA is incompatible with today’s technology and it impedes basic
business operations in a way that Congress could not have intended. 222
The Autodialer prohibitions now reach all calls utilizing specific
technology, instead of specific types of calls and questions remain about
the proper definition and use of an Autodialer. These lingering issues
prevent legitimate and lawful communications between businesses and
their customers and places businesses in the crosshairs of potentially
devastating litigation. The continued application of an odd and archaic
law is absurd and unnecessary, given there are more modern tools
available to combat the same nuisance calls Congress sought to address
with the TCPA.
A. The Ever-Evolving Definition of an Autodialer Negatively Impacts
Consumers and Frustrates Privacy Protection Practices
In 1991, Americans relied on landlines as their primary means of
communication, so businesses called these lines to reach their
customers.223 In fact, Congress found that “30,000 businesses actively
telemark[ed] goods and services” to homes and businesses and “[m]ore
than 300,000 solicitors call[ed] more than 18,000,000 Americans every
day.”224 However, Congress did not restrict the use of an Autodialer for
calls to landlines.225 Congress sought to preserve everyday targeted
communications and did not intend the TCPA to encompass businesses

220. See
Mobile
Fact
Sheet,
PEW RES. CTR.
(April
7,
2021),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/mobile/ (“Americans today are increasingly
connected to the world of digital information while ‘on the go’ via smartphones and other
mobile devices.”).
221. See id.
222. H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at 17 (1991).
223. See generally Fischer-Baum, supra note 1; Percentage of housing units with
telephones in the United States from 1920 to 2008, STATISTA (2021),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/189959/housing-units-with-telephones-in-the-unitedstates-since-1920/.
224. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2, 105 Stat.
2394, 2394.
225. Id. The restriction applied unless the call was made for emergency purposes or made
with the prior express consent of the recipient. Id.
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calls to customers.226 Nevertheless, since the TCPA’s enactment, the
law has been extended to these types of calls, negatively impacting
consumers.
Since the FCC has interpreted the TCPA’s prohibitions to apply to
any call that the recipient might receive and consider a surprise,227
businesses are rightfully concerned about inadvertently violating the law
even while communicating for the benefit or protection of their
customers. Companies deliberately gather mobile phone numbers from
consumers all the time. Call recipients often provide their cellular phone
numbers, expecting to receive a phone call or a text from the business.228
These phone numbers are also used to facilitate privacy and security
controls to ensure customers’ personal information and accounts are
protected.
In Facebook, the Supreme Court expressly declined to decide
whether text messages are a “call” covered by the TCPA.229 Moreover,
it is unclear whether automated text messages might constitute a
“prerecorded call.” This leaves companies at risk of being sued for the
use of technology designed to protect consumer privacy, such as twofactor authentication. Banks,230 online payments systems,231 and
thousands of small businesses232 utilize SMS two-factor authorization to
communicate with and protect their customers’ privacy. When a
consumer logs into their account, the technology can send a message via
SMS text message to the consumer to provide an added layer of security.
While newer multi-factor authentication technologies are on the rise,

226. H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at 17 (“The Committee does not intend for this restriction to
be a barrier to the normal, expected or desired communications between businesses and their
customers.”).
227. 2008 FCC Order, supra note 98, at 565.
228. See, e.g., Blow v. Bijora, Inc., 855 F.3d 793, 803 (7th Cir. 2017) (noting that the
TCPA plaintiff “gave her cell phone number to [the caller] on several different occasions,”
which was then added to a text messaging list).
229. Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163, 1168 n.2 (2021) (“Neither party disputes
that the TCPA’s prohibition also extends to sending unsolicited text messages. We therefore
assume that it does without considering or resolving that issue.” (citation omitted)).
230. See Nelson Cicchitto, Which Companies Use Multi-Factor Authentication With Their
Customers?, AVATIER (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.avatier.com/blog/companies-use-multifactor-authentication-customers/.
231. See, e.g., PayPal Help Center, PAYPAL, https://www.paypal.com/bm/smarthelp/
article/how-do-i-turn-on-or-off-2-step-verification-for-paypal-account-login-faq4057 (last
visited Aug. 15, 2021).
232. See TEXTMAGIC, https://www.textmagic.com/2fa-sms/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2021)
(stating that thousands of small businesses are using their SMS two-factor authentication
technology).
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SMS is still widely popular.233 With cybercrime being one of the largest
global threats,234 restricting the use of security measures like SMS twofactor authorization would thwart the very policy goal Congress was
attempting to advance in protecting privacy.
While Facebook v. Duguid never mentions two-factor
authentication, it is a clear implication of the case. The text messages
Facebook sent Duguid were sought to increase the security of the
Facebook account associated with the mobile telephone number.235 By
sending a login notification, the text is meant to alert the user of a login
attempt on an unrecognized device.236 However, since the parties didn’t
raise the issue of whether a text message constitutes a prerecorded call
(or a call, for that matter), there is room for interpretation and further
exploitation of another ambiguity. Without classification, these types of
prerecorded text messages might be illegal to send absent express
consent. Therefore, this could undermine one of the most widely used
authentication techniques, and adversely impact business’ targeted
communications with consumers and the same privacy rights Congress
intended to protect with the TCPA.
B. A Change in the Monetization of Cellphone Plans Renders the
Purpose for ATDS Restrictions Obsolete
The FCC initially adopted rules restricting the use of an ATDS to
make a call to a cellphone237 because the call recipient shouldered the
cost.238 At the time, it was standard practice for cell phone carriers to
monetize cell phone plans by offering varying levels of a fixed number
of minutes and/or texts. Today, however, when more people own a cell
phone than a toothbrush,239 the most popular cell phone carriers offer
233. Chris Hoffman, SMS Two-Factor Auth Isn’t Perfect, But You Should Still Use It,
HOW-TO GEEK (Mar. 4, 2019, 12:31 PM), https://www.howtogeek.com/361244/sms-twofactor-auth-isn%E2%80%99t-perfect-but-you-should-still-use-it/.
234. See 5 Industries that Gain the Most from Two-factor Authentication, ROUTEE (Sept.
12, 2019), https://www.routee.net/blog/5-industries-that-gain-the-most-from-two-factorauthentication/ (“[T]he WEF reported that cybercrime was the third largest global threat in
2018. In 2019, the cost of cybercrime will be greater than $2 trillion.”).
235. See Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., 926 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 2019), rev’d, 141 S. Ct.
1163 (2021).
236. See 5 Industries that Gain the Most from Two-factor Authentication, supra note 234;
see also Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., No. 15-CV-00985-JST, 2017 WL 3128912 (N.D. Cal. July
24, 2017), rev’d, 926 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2019), rev’d, 141 S. Ct. 1163 (2021).
237. See 1992 FCC Order, supra note 9, at 8753.
238. See H.R. REP NO. 102-317, at 24 (1991) (“[C]ustomers who pay additional fees for
cellular phones, pagers, or unlisted numbers are inconvenienced and even charged for
receiving unsolicited calls from automatic dialer systems.”).
239. Deyan Georgiev, 39+ Smartphone Statistics You Should Know in 2020, REV. 42,
https://review42.com/smartphone-statistics/ (last updated Mar. 7, 2022).
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unlimited talk and text plans.240 An incoming call or text will rarely, if
ever, increase the recipient’s cell phone bill. Moreover, wireless costs
have only decreased.241
It is also important to remember that when the restrictions were
enacted in 1991 only six percent of Americans had a cellphone.242 Now,
over ninety-seven percent of Americans have a cell phone243 and cell
phones have rendered residential telephones obsolete.244 This means that
Autodialer restrictions on “calls” to cell phones impacts exceedingly
more communications than originally intended by Congress. Thus,
Congress’ initial reasons for restricting the use of an Autodialer to make
calls to cell phones are outdated and no longer applicable to
contemporary technology and modern-day monetization trends.
C. Government-Enabled Tools Are Now Available to Protect
Consumers in the Same Way Congress Hoped to Protect Consumers
with the Enactment of the TCPA
The problematic Autodialer (and prerecorded) prohibitions are not
warranted because we now have several effective federally enabled tools
to help combat nuisance calls, protect individuals’ privacy, and regulate
telemarketing. Call recipients certainly do not care what type of
technology was used to reach them.245 They care only that an unwanted
call was blocked effectively. While telemarketing regulation is
240. See AT&T, https://www.att.com/plans/wireless/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2021); see also
VERIZON, https://www.verizon.com/plans/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2021).
241. John R. Quain, Is It Safe to Get Rid of Your Landline?, AARP (Aug. 25, 2020),
https://www.aarp.org/home-family/personal-technology/info-2020/get-rid-of-landline.html
(“[A]s landline costs have risen — in urban areas the federal Bureau of Labor Statistics shows
a 31 percent increase from May 2011 to May 2021 — wireless costs in the same 10-year
period have decreased by 20 percent.”).
242. Fischer-Baum, supra note 1.
243. See Mobile Fact Sheet, supra note 220.
244. Jacob Kastrenakes, Most US households have given up landlines for cellphones, THE
VERGE (May 4, 2017, 12:54 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/5/4/15544596/americanhouseholds-now-use-cellphones-more-than-landlines (“Most US homes no longer use
landline phone service and instead rely on cellphones to stay connected.”); see also Quain,
supra note 241 (“As of June 2020, . . . only 2.3 percent of adults said they had a landline alone
without cellphone service.”).
245. Daniel L. Delnero, The TCPA and the First Amendment: Where We Are and Where
We’re Going, X NAT’L L. REV. (July 13, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/tcpaand-first-amendment-where-we-are-and-where-we-re-going (“If residential privacy is truly
the concern addressed by the TCPA, then the ATDS and prerecorded message prohibitions
are not necessary, because the TCPA’s Do Not Call registry provision adequately addresses
such concerns. Further, the Do Not Call provisions are more tailored to the actual consumer
harm – to the extent any exists – because recipients of annoying telemarketing calls do not
really care what technology was used to reach them. And fraud is better addressed by
longstanding wire fraud statutes.”).
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necessary, maintaining a law that has caused confusion and chilled
speech since its inception is not.
Congress initially empowered both the FCC and the FTC to enact
rules and programs to combat nuisance telemarketing calls.246 In 1995,
the FTC promulgated the Telemarketing Sales Rule, which regulates
telemarketers, sets limits on the time-of-day telemarketers may call
consumers, and restricts calls to consumers who have requested not to
be called again.247 In 2003, the FTC created the Federal Do-Not-Call
Registry, allowing consumers to register their home and mobile phone
number to stop unwanted sales calls.248 Congress described the
legislation as “an important step toward a one-stop solution to reducing
telemarketing abuses.”249 Yet, in 1992 the FCC initially rejected or
deferred these same ideas due to cost and implementation concerns.250
Since that time, the FCC and FTC have launched various programs to
reduce the intrusiveness of telemarketing calls and empower consumers.
The FTC also collects consumer complaints of unwanted calls and,
in partnership with law enforcement agencies, conducts investigations,
and takes action against those responsible for the illegal calls for which
fines can reach up to $42,530 per call.251 Additionally, the FCC recently
constructed a framework for stopping robocalls at the telephone carrier
level, currently referred to as the SHAKEN/STIR.252 These and other
federally-enabled call blocking tools are now largely available to

246. Congress empowered the FTC with the authority to limit telemarketing with the
Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 6101-08) in
1994. Congress empowered the FCC with the TCPA.
247. See Telemarketing Sales Rule, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/
enforcement/rules/rulemaking-regulatory-reform-proceedings/telemarketing-sales-rule (last
visited Jan. 29, 2020).
248. See National Do Not Call Registry, FED. TRADE COMMISSION,
https://www.donotcall.gov/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2020); see also National Do Not Call
Registry
FAQs,
FED.
TRADE
COMMISSION
CONSUMER
ADVICE,
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0108-national-do-not-call-registry (last visited Mar.
20, 2022).
249. H.R. REP. NO. 108-8, at 3 (2003).
250. See supra Section II.B.3 and accompanying notes.
251. National Do Not Call Registry, supra note 248.
252. FCC Mandates STIR/SHAKEN to Combat Spoofed Robocalls, FED. COMM.
COMMISSION,
https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-mandates-stirshaken-combat-spoofedrobocalls (last visited Jan. 29, 2021). STIR/SHAKEN are acronyms for the Secure Telephone
Identity Revisited (STIR) and Signature-based Handling of Asserted Information Using
toKENs (SHAKEN) standards. Id.; Combatting Spoofed Robocalls with Caller ID
Authentication, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, https://www.fcc.gov/call-authentication (last
visited Mar. 20, 2022).
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consumers, further empowering them to take corrective action against
specific unwanted callers.253
These programs are intended to directly target and regulate the
same telemarketing activities Congress initially hoped to curb with the
TCPA. Instead of placing restrictions on technology used to streamline
communications, these programs are rightfully tailored to the actual
consumer harm. Most importantly, it puts the power directly into the
consumer’s hands.
D. ATDS Confusion Has Increased TCPA Litigation Leading to Class
Action Abuse
In recent years, the TCPA has become a bountiful area of the law
for nuisance lawsuits.254 Class action lawyers are often rewarded with
quick settlements,255 even in cases that might not have merit, simply
because of the litigation uncertainty and risk of massive monetary
damages. The TCPA is very powerful because it holds offenders strictly
liable.256 This means that a caller will be held liable regardless of
whether they were careless or had malicious intent.257
Congress’ rationale for the strict liability statue and associated
penalties was to give consumers a simple way to recover damages
without the need for attorneys.258 Prior to the TCPA’s inception, Senator
Hollings, who sponsored the law, explained that the law was intended to
“make it as easy as possible for consumers to bring such actions,
preferably in [state] small claims court.”259 However, after the Supreme

253. See CONSUMER & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS BUREAU, FCC, CG DOCKET NO. 1759, CALL BLOCKING TOOLS NOW SUBSTANTIALLY AVAILABLE TO CONSUMERS: REPORT ON
CALL BLOCKING (2020), https://aboutblaw.com/RFJ.
254. Eric J. Troutman, FAST START-TCPA Filings (and Class Actions) Spike to Start the
New Year, TCPAWORLD (Jan. 5, 2021), https://tcpaworld.com/2021/01/05/fast-start-tcpafilings-and-class-actions-spike-to-start-the-new-year/.
255. TCPA Robocalls Settlement, CLASSACTION.COM, https://www.classaction.com/
tcpa-robocalls/settlement/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2021).
256. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) (2018); see also Eric J. Troutman, Recycled Number Blues:
Good Faith Defense Rejected Again as Liberty University Trapped in TCPA Suit, XII NAT’L
L. REV. (Mar. 10, 2022), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/recycled-number-bluesgood-faith-defense-rejected-again-liberty-university-trapped; see also Seeking shelter from
the (TCPA) storm: statutory safe harbor provides protection, EVERSHEDS SUTHERLAND LLP
(Feb.
22,
2022),
https://us.eversheds-sutherland.com/NewsCommentary/LegalAlerts/248819/
Seeking-shelter-from-the-TCPA-storm-statutory-safe-harbor-provides-protection.
257. See Strict Liability, L. DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/strict-liability/ (last
visited Jan. 31, 2021).
258. 137 CONG. REC. S16204-01, S16205-S16206 (1991).
259. Id. (stating that the TCPA contains a private right of action that “would allow
consumers to bring an action in State court . . . preferably in small claims court.”).
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Court unanimously held that U.S. District courts have federal question
jurisdiction over TCPA claims,260 businesses who had once found
reprieve invoking state laws limiting class actions261 were now
vulnerable. TCPA class actions lawsuits rose sixty-three percent that
year.262
Another explosion of class action litigation occurred after the FCC
affirmed its sprawling interpretation of an ATDS in 2015.263 Shortly
thereafter, the ACA International court narrowed the definition of an
ATDS and we saw a significant decrease in individual TCPA filings.264
All the while, class actions were still on the rise.265
Unfortunately, while the Facebook opinion provides some relief to
businesses, it also introduces ambiguity which will lead to further
litigation. While most of the opinion frames the ATDS definition in
terms of “capacity,” other parts of the opinion refer to “use.”266 The
Court stated that the “equipment in question must use a random or
sequential number generator.”267 This begs the question, does
technology with the simple “capacity” to use a random or sequential
number generator qualify as an ATDS? Or must it currently use a
random or sequential number generator?
Without change, the TCPA will remain a hotbed for litigation.268
Litigation risk will chill and impede business communications of
important and time-sensitive information to the detriment of
consumers.269 Congress ought to remember the original intent in
enacting the TCPA and compare it with the real results of enforcement
today. Is it truly what they intended? Legislative history suggests that
Congress intended TCPA actions—with damages set at $500 per

260. See Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 376 (2012).
261. See, e.g., § 901(b) of New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules. These defendants
had successfully argued that state laws prohibiting certain types of class actions trumped
federal diversity jurisdiction over the class action.
262. Monica Desai et. al., A TCPA for the 21st Century: Why TCPA Lawsuits are on the
Rise and What the FCC Should do About it, 8 IJMM 75 (2013),
https://www.squirepattonboggs.com/-/media/files/insights/publications/2014/07/a-tcpa-forthe-21st-century/atcpaforthe21stcentury.pdf.
263. 2015 FCC Order, supra note 12, at 7964.
264. Desai et. al., supra note 262.
265. Id.; ACA Int’l v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 885 F.3d 687, 693 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
266. Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163 (2021).
267. Id. at 1170.
268. See Desai et. al., supra note 262.
269. For example, risks might include notice that there is a billing issue or that a payment
is due, receive basic information about time-sensitive prescription refill reminders or other
healthcare notifications.
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violation—would be most suitable for small claims court.270 Yet, with
the change in technology, businesses are now more vulnerable to class
action lawsuits than ever. With no limit on the amount of damages,271
courts can exact ruinous liability.272
V. PROPOSAL
Congress and the FCC have undoubtedly advocated for consumers
through their commitment to the underlying principles of the TCPA. At
the same time, it is critical that legislation keeps pace with modern day
technology and allow businesses to communicate with their customers
effectively and efficiently. Regulatory relief is required because
compliance-minded businesses are consistently threatened with
litigation and regularly compelled into sizable settlements for actions
that don’t threaten the interests the statute initially intended to safeguard.
The law is abused through litigation theories that were
unimaginable at its inception. Congress can advance reforms without
impairing its important work to combat harmful calls and protect the
privacy and financial interests of consumers. With the implementation
of recent federally enabled programs,273 the FCC has already begun
laying a foundation for which it can modernize the TCPA. These
programs rightfully provide consumers with the power of choice.274
A. Regulate the Type of Call, Not the Technology
Congress should stop regulating technology because it is clear that
the legislation cannot keep up. Instead of attempting to enforce a law
with a checkered past, Congress should protect consumers by regulating
the types of calls. Businesses should not be exposed to liability simply
because of the technology they used to call their customers.
Naturally, any regulation of speech implicates the First
Amendment. We saw this in Barr, where the Court held that the TCPA’s
debt-collection exemption impermissibly favored a particular type of
270. See 137 CONG. REC. S16204-01 (1991) (stating that the TCPA contains a private
right of action that “would allow consumers to bring an action in State court . . . preferably in
small claims court”).
271. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (2018).
272. The largest TCPA damages award was $925 million dollars against a company for
improper marketing under the TCPA and an Oregon court found the award was not
unconstitutionally excessive. Weiner Brodsky Kider PC, Judge Rejects Due Process
Arguments and Enters $925 Mil TCPA Award, JDSUPRA (Sept. 5, 2020),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/judge-rejects-due-process-arguments-and-44764.
273. See discussion supra Section IV.3.
274. See discussion supra Section IV.3. For example, consumers can place their phone
number on the Do Not Call list to prevent telemarketing calls.
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speech, thus violating the First Amendment.275 However, the First
Amendment does not protect all speech. For example, it does not
provide protection for false statements of fact276 or false advertising.277
The First Amendment also does not protect forms of speech that are used
to commit a crime, such as extortion or harassment.278 As a result, the
First Amendment should not serve as a barrier to legitimate regulation
of intrusive calls.
Congress may continue advancing privacy and economic interests
but should do so by focusing on combating the real issue, scam and fraud
calls. Fraudsters should not be able to escape TCPA liability simply
because they didn’t utilize prohibited technology. These are the calls
that invade American’s privacy interests and are costly and dangerous to
consumers today.
The harm caused by scam and fraud calls became even more
obvious during the COVID-19 pandemic. Scam calls more than doubled
from 2020 to 2021.279 There were 88 million scam victims and over $44
billion in scam losses in 2021 alone.280 In the same year, over forty-five
percent of all Americans received a spam call on their cell phone every
day and nearly one in three Americans fell victim to a phone scam, with
the average reported loss of around $502.281
These scam calls follow a pattern. Scammers prey on vulnerable
consumers and issues. They use fear and deception to prompt their
victims to act and often include warranties, loans, taxes, the IRS, and
social security.282 In fact, debt relief, free offers, and credit repair scams
saw an exorbitant increase during the COVID-19 pandemic.283 While
financial institutions petitioned the FCC to issue a rule clarifying their
fraud and security alerts on matters related to the COVID-19 pandemic
were exempt from the TCPA restrictions (a ruling which never came as
275. See Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Political Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335 (2020).
276. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
277. See Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990); see
also Barr, 140 S. Ct. at 2360 (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing the prohibition and regulation
of false advertising as necessary content-based restrictions).
278. See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949) (“[I]t has never
been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal
merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced or carried out by means of
language, either spoken, written, or printed.”).
279. Looking Back: 2021 Scam Call Trends, FIRST ORION, https://firstorion.com/2021scam-call-trends/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2022).
280. Id.
281. Megan Leonhardt, Americans lost $29.8 billion to phone scams alone over the past
year, CNBC (June 29, 2021, 9:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/29/americans-lostbillions-of-dollars-to-phone-scams-over-the-past-year.html.
282. Looking Back: 2021 Scam Call Trends, supra note 279.
283. Id.
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of the date of this Note), debt relief scams rose more than 4,000 percent,
free offer scams rose more than 1,000 percent, and credit repair scams
rose more than 800 percent.284
Thus, Congress should regulate unwanted calls based on the content
of the call to protect consumer’s financial and privacy interests. The
TCPA could be revised or repealed. If revised, the TCPA should
prohibit calls engaging in false advertising, deception, and/or
harassment, instead of the type of technology used to make the call.
Congress could also require phone carriers to regulate calls by
encouraging or requiring network operators to block traffic from
scammers. These changes would help curb abusive lawsuits against
well-intentioned businesses and protect Americans from the widespread
harms of today. Without necessary reforms, the TCPA will continue to
harm consumers, the cohort of individuals it was enacted to protect.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since its enactment, the TCPA has been stretched and construed in
various directions in an unsuccessful attempt to ensure its continued
relevancy. Efforts to modernize and extend the reach of the TCPA have
simply led to more confusion, a surge in TCPA litigation, and a negative
impact on businesses and consumers. The TCPA has strayed too far
from its original purpose, and Congress has the power to fix that.
Congress initially prohibited an Autodialer from making calls to
emergency lines, hospital lines, and cellular telephones because of the
intrusive nature of telemarketing and the costly fees associated with
receiving unsolicited calls on cellphones.285 However, with the change
in technology, consumers are no longer incurring costly fees on their cell
phones, and the restrictions on the type of technology used by businesses
to communicate with consumers is chilling their speech and actually
causing harm to consumers.
In Facebook, the Supreme Court rightfully narrowed the definition
of an ATDS. However, it was unable to reform the law leaving wellintentioned businesses at risk and consumers in harm’s way. Therefore,
Congress must step up to modernize the odd law. With innovative
technologies and government-enabled programs directed at protecting
consumers’ privacy and economic interests and regulating
telemarketing, restrictions on the type of technology used to make the
284. See Public Notice, supra note 218; see also Looking Back: 2021 Scam Call Trends,
supra note 279.
285. See Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat.
2394, 2394 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2018)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 102317, at 24 (1991).
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calls are no longer necessary. The government can effectively
accomplish its goal of protecting consumers and their privacy interests
through these programs while updating the TCPA to regulate damaging
calls, without punishing businesses. It is the content of the call that
matters, not the technology used.
By addressing these important issues, Congress can help limit
abusive lawsuits. Congress needs to provide businesses with certainty
and ensure they have the ability to communicate in an efficient manner
that best meets the demands of their customers. Congress must
recognize that technology has changed since the TCPA’s enactment, and
it is time to modernize the rules for the realities of today.

